In the late 1950’s, after the death of Joseph Stalin, the USSR was in disarray, despite crackdowns and tightening of communist social standards, many saw Stalin’s death as an opportunity for rebellion and change. Among these were the Stilyagi, the Russian equivalent of America’s hippie movement. The Stilyagi dressed outlandishly, idolized the west and listened to music dubbed decadent and capitalist by the powers that be. This movement was meant to express the rebellious desires of the children of the Soviet elite, it entailed 3 main facets, worship of America and the west, dance and music that was typically frowned upon or forbidden, and outlandish clothing and styles.

The first element of Stilyagi culture was worship of America and the west. The Stilyagi attempted to breach soviet cultural norms by openly approving of and appreciating the culture of western Europe and America. An excellent example of what the common people of the USSR thought of this can be drawn from a satirical paper called “Crocodile” which wrote an article about Stylagi in 1949, as the movement was just starting, it had this to say about them :

“The stilyaga knows the fashions all over the world, but he doesn’t know Griboedov, as you’ve discovered yourself. He’s studied all the fox trots, tangos, rumbas, lindy hops in detail, but he confuses Michurin with Mendeleev, and astronomy with gastronomy. He’s memorized all the arias from Sylvia and Maritza, but doesn’t know who wrote the operas Ivan Susanin and Prince Igor.”

The contempt for one so immersed in western culture is clear, Crocodile is attempting to equate the interest in the West with stupidity, and arrogance, in line with common communist agendas of the day. At the same time it demonstrates an excellent (if critical and exaggerated) exemplification of Stilyagi culture, the young man described in the text is well versed in western fashion, history and culture but knows nothing of Russia by comparison.

The second element of Stilyagi culture is dance and music that was highly frowned upon, or in some cases illegal in the USSR. Examples include Jazz, Rock and all forms of music from the west, in the same Crocodile article, the author discusses a dance the Stilyagi man it describes does, saying this about it:

“I had long ago noticed that, whatever ordinary dance music–a waltz or krakowiak–was playing, the stilyaga and Mumochka were doing some sort of horribly complicated and absurd movements, something in between a can-can and the dance of the savages from the Land of Fire. Their ecstatic exertions had them twisting around in the very center of the circle.”

again, the contempt for the dance and music of the Stilyagi was clear, with Russian dance music and classical dances like the Waltz being held up as an example of “normal” while the Stilyagi dance is “horribly complicated” and  “absurd”. The author again takes a dig at them for breaking societal norms, and in this way shows the leavings over of Stalinism, despite the declining helath and eventual death of the dictator the political elite clung to his politics becuase they were in positions of power and change might mean they would lose that power. The same reaction to the Bolshevik movement was seen in the Tsarist government before the October revolution, and was seen in America in the 60’s and 70’s.

The final pillar of the Stilyagi was outlandish clothing. The literal translation of Stilyagi actually means “Style Hunters” which is a reference to the Stilyagi’s extensive searching for black market clothes from the west, in the article from Crocodile, the author describes the Stilyagi man’s clothing:

“He looked incredibly absurd: the back of his jacket was bright orange, while the sleeves and lapels were green; I hadn’t seen such broad canary-green trousers since the days of the renowned bell-bottoms’; his boots were a clever combination of black varnish and red suede.”

Again, the contempt is palatable, the author describes him as “absurd” and makes a point of describing the brightness of  his clothes. Stilyagi were obsessed with making a scene of their desire to look western, and this example is, though extreme, not far from the truth. Their dress was so extreme, that in some places roving mobs of more conservative citizens would attack them with scissors and cut their hair and clothes in an effort to discourage such behavior.

Eventually, the Stilyagi movement planted the seeds of the cultural rebellion that matured in to the full on cultural overthrow at the end of the USSR, and though they were not political rebels, they starting the ball rolling on a much bigger movement than one simply concerned with looks and music.

Sources: Stilyagi the movie

Stilyagi and Teddy boys

Stilyagi dance video

Crocodile Article

17 Moments

Stilyagi definition and further reading 

Image source

In the post World War Two era the USSR found itself in a strong position, with most of Eastern Europe under its control, and a great armed threat to its existence annihilated, the Soviets were safe within their lands again, but they needed to consolidate their gains, and to do so they needed to harness previously un tapped sources of propaganda. In Estonia, that propaganda came in the form of a traditional singing festival originally started to preserve Estonian national identity in the face of the Tsars. The USSR attempted to harness it for their own purposes, making the festival about the fraternity of Socialist Republics and forcing the participants to carry Soviet slogans and signs, but the Estonians reversed it on them, they used the festival to bind their people together even more tightly, and to preserve and promote their identity with their own unique and long standing traditions.

The revolution is typically described as starting in the late 1980’s, but the truth is that it started far sooner than that, with the first post war singing festival in 1947, the Soviet government was attempting to harness the strong national spirit of the Estonian people to bring them in to the fold, but the Estonians had other plans. The Estonians went along with the Soviet plans for the festival, but they retained their national unity until the time was ripe for them to declare independence in 1991 as the USSR crumbled. Examples of the national unity that kept the Estonians going all those years can be seen everywhere, in one particular artifact it is particularly evident. The former Estonian national anthem (reinstated in 1990) is full of pride, and unity essential to such a small and vulnerable nation:

“My native land, my joy, delight,
How fair thou art and bright!
And nowhere in the world all round
Can ever such a place be found
So well beloved as I love thee,
My native country dear!”

While the Moscow government assumed that the people singing this song meant Russian when they said “Native Land” the vast majority of Estonians referred to their own country.

Ultimately, this iron willed national unity brought about the end of Soviet rule of Estonia in the Singing Revolution of the late 80’s, and was quickly followed by the independence of the rest of the Baltic states.

Sources: http://www.local-life.com/tallinn/articles/estonian-singing-revolution

https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=26

On the night of August 31st 1935, a 30 year old coal minder named Aleksei Stakhanov cut 102 tons of coal in under six hours, more than 14 times the standard coal quota for his mine. In a single evening of fervent work, the new soviet workers movement, Stakhanovism, was born, and a hero of labor was created. Stakhanovism played in to the policy of rapid industrialization that was so central to Stalinism, it provided a hero to the people, and drove them to work harder to achieve goals which brought Russia in to the modern era. The movement was not without its flaws however, and low quality of production, and a reckless disregard for safety while chasing records are amongst its greatest failings.

The advent of the Stakhanvite movement can be seen as an attempt by the administration of the USSR to revive the failing industrialization drive after the end of the NEP. While Stalin was busy suppressing political uprisings, and incarcerating people in Gulags (aprox 11 million people), the vast numbers of workers who died due to shortages, accidents and political crackdowns (aprox 20.6 million people) resulted in slower industrial growth as a result of the loss of labor force, and this necessitated a morale and production boost in the form of a new hero, and a new movement. When the Stakhanvite movement came along, it provided both to the administration of the USSR, with Stakhanov providing a perfect example of a model soviet citizen, and sparking a workers movement that overshadowed even the shock worker movement. Stakhanvite’s set new records across the country, pushing ever higher in pursuit of records of production and all the privileges which attended such feats. The efficiency of steel furnaces and mills increased, and overall production was up by (according to a Stakhanov himself) 82% in comparison to the 63% envisioned by the second five year plan. The movement provided momentum to the second five year plan, and political capital as workers began to truly embrace the benefits of communism, striving hard to improve overall quality of life in the country, and receive nicer accommodations and higher pay for their feats in the mine pits or on the factory floors.

The movement, however, was not without its flaws, and its success was highly overstated by the government. The idea that a country could experience 14 percent GNP growth per year with over 30 million of its people being killed or underemployed in the same time is preposterous, and though the economy grew it was not quick enough, as we can see in the remainder of the USSR’s economic history and its eventual collapse. The speed with which workers began to operate also resulted in a lowering of overall work quality, and created supply issues when Stakhanvite’s were rewarded with higher pay and finer living quarters. Some scholars even propose that Stakhanov’s record was simply a publicity stunt, orchestrated for propaganda purposes, and that the simple reorganization of how work was done was not enough to meet the incredibly high goals of the second five year plan. In time, Stakhanvite’s came to be resented, and in modern times the term is used in a derogatory manner to refer to workers obsessed with over achieving. In the end, Stalin’s obsession with cultural transformation  and political control torpedoed the chances of the second five year plan meeting its goals, the loss of labor force, forced collectivization and rapid movement to the cities coupled with the push for faster, if less high quality work, created by the Stakhanvite movement resulted in slowed economic growth, and eventually the internal rotting and collapse of the economy of the USSR.

Sources: Mass Culture in Soviet Russia by James Von Geldern and Richard Stites (Pg. 238-243)

Rosefielde: Stalinist Economic Development in the 1930’s (Pg. 277-289)

http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/history-and-mythology/aleksey-stakhanov/

In the early 1920’s, the newly solidified government of Russia began seeking to consolidate its gains and secure its future as the sole ruling group in Moscow. One of the primary objectives they set before themselves was the destruction of the Eastern Orthodox church, thus began years of anti religious campaigns, church closings and occasional, violent clashes with villagers fighting for their religion. While Communist party and Marxist rhetoric does preach a creed of strict atheism, the attacks on the church went above and beyond what was called for, and occurred far too rapidly, building a great deal of resentment amongst the rural villagers with whom the urban party leaders had such a large disconnect. In some examples, local police would shut down a church against the resistance of locals, and religious activism to save the church was widespread and vigorous. In spite of this, urban party leaders and communist intellectuals pressed the attack, not realizing that they were alienating the largest single economic and social class in Russia at the time. Examples of this include Leon Trotsky’s article “Vodka, The Church and Cinema” which exemplifies the superiority complex, and patronizing attitude towards peasants that was endemic in Moscow during the years of the NEP, when the attack on the church was at its height. Trotsky’s view of peasants as simpletons who were entertained by repetition and sensual stimulation demonstrates the clear and profound misunderstandings of the party leadership regarding the complex and and deep seated relationship between the rural farmers and the Orthodox Church. The result of this deep misunderstanding was ultimately the loss of support from the rural population for the communist government, which contributed in turn to the ultimate fall of the Soviet Union.

Sources: https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/women/life/23_07_12.htm

https://books.google.com/books?id=B8ur9CbLauAC&pg=PA227&lpg=PA227&dq=account+of+church+closing+resisted+by+villagers+russia&source=bl&ots=fARXsXkL6x&sig=w0bHoEMtILCGelk-hVC4vgZyIDU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMIiMGSwoCsyAIVCpENCh2y9AfJ#v=onepage&q=account%20of%20church%20closing%20resisted%20by%20villagers%20russia&f=false

In 1923 Leon Trotsky wrote an article for Pravda in which he explored the relationship of the church to the revolution, espoused the virtues of Cinema as a tool for re educating the masses, and went about describing how cinema could be used as a weapon by the Bolsheviks to destroy alcoholism and religion within the budding USSR. Unsaid in Trotsky’s article, but equally important is the reason that the Bolsheviks were such ruthless, cunning and productive propagandists, the need for political capital to keep the revolution alive and ensure they retained their hard won strongly motivated the hard push for propaganda films, and the modernization and streamlining of the Communist propaganda machine.

In his article, Trotsky details the ways in which the peasant classes had been indoctrinated by the church, and also describes briefly the issue with alcoholism in Russia in the early 20th century, throughout the course of his writing, Trotsky lays out in detail the reasons that cinema can supplant religion and drinking in Russian culture. The first, and arguably most important reason that cinema was a vital method of distributing propaganda was that it could reach the illiterate, in 1920, only 2 out of five Russian adults could read (Kenez Pg 30) and this meant that leaflets, newspapers and magazines could not reach the target audience, they had succeeded in indoctrinating the liberal intellectuals, but a different method would be required to reach the masses. Cinema provided the perfect vehicle, it was interesting, straightforward, an advanced new technology that generated vast interest in all, young, old, rich and poor. In his article, Trotsky details how similar it is to the church, in that it stimulates the sense, brings people together, and provides theatrical entertainment, the key difference being that the cinema provides a multitude of different stories, while the church played out the same story, over and over again. Because of its newness, and because of its variation, Trotsky argues that the cinema can replace the church in the lives of the masses, and at the same time be used to control and direct them through propaganda. In the long term, history did not bear out Trotsky’s prediction, it would seem that he underestimated how entrenched in rural culture religion was, and despite initial short term success, in the end Eastern Orthodoxy made a comeback as soon as the communist propaganda machine collapsed with the rest of the USSR.

The reason that Trotsky and the Bolsheviks pushed cinema so hard as a mode of propaganda is primarily the need for political capital so that they could continue to reshape Russia, the position of the communists in 1923 was precarious, they had defeated the White/Green/Black armies arrayed against them, but they still stood at the precipice of political catastrophe. In order to retain power, they needed everyone on board with the new program as fast as possible, and leaflets and magazines which wouldn’t reach 3/5th’s of the population simply would not cut it. In keeping with the Bolshevik theme of cleaving to urban workers and new technology, the cinema was utilized as an antithesis for the backwardness and superstition of religion, with party leaders believing that the factors i described above would bring them the political might to rebuild Russia in to a communist utopia. In the short term, this was successful, and Russia rapidly underwent a cultural revolution, resulting in the USSR as we know it.

In conclusion, the cinema was a vital part of Bolshevik propaganda, and its effective usage is in a large way responsible for the creation and sustainment of the USSR,  however, in the long run it was not quite enough, and the failure of communism to bridge the gap between urban intellectuals and the rural masses eventually brought it down.

Sources: https://books.google.com/books?id=VGE4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=the+use+of+cinema+for+propaganda+in+soviet+russia&source=bl&ots=9CJ2FhZQ-w&sig=n3EuU0HzxhnUI20TXrr0sFsNck4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEkQ6AEwCGoVChMItOO0xKOGyAIVS5iACh3pIQt-#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://www.academia.edu/6387163/A_Study_of_Soviet_Propaganda